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Inception: Virtual Space in Memory Space in Real Space – Memory Forensics of
Immersive Virtual Reality with the HTC Vive
Peter Casey1, Rebecca Lindsay-Decusati1, Ibrahim Baggili1, Frank Breitinger1
Abstract
Virtual Reality (VR) has become a reality. With the technology’s increased use cases, comes its misuse. Malware affecting
the Virtual Environment (VE) may prevent an investigator from ascertaining virtual information from a physical scene,
or from traditional ”dead” analysis. Following the trend of anti-forensics, evidence of an attack may only be found in
memory, along with many other volatile data points. Our work provides the primary account for the memory forensics of
Immersive VR systems, and in specific the HTC Vive. Our approach is capable of reconstituting artifacts from memory
that are relevant to the VE, and is also capable of reconstructing a visualization of the room setup a VR player was
immersed into. In specific, we demonstrate that the VE, location, state and class of VR devices can be extracted from
memory. Our work resulted in the first open source VR memory forensics plugin for the Volatility Framework. We
discuss our findings, and our replicable approach that may be used in future memory forensics research.
Keywords:
Memory Forensics, Data recovery, Virtual Reality, Reverse Engineering
1. Introduction
With the rise in popularity of Virtual Reality (VR)
devices, and their new found residence in the consumer
marketplace, these complex systems will soon become an
important source of digital evidence. Hardware improve-
ments, price reductions and a boom of content has led to
over 1 million VR headsets being sold in 2017 (Lamkin,
2017). As end users have readily adopted Augmented Re-
ality (AR), VR, and Mixed Reality (MR) alike, the foren-
sics community has lagged in preparing for a new envi-
ronment, where crimes and evidence are a coalescence of
virtual and physical realities.
Virtual Environments (VEs), hosting new types of so-
cial interaction, may also be the locale for misconduct.
Reports of sexual harassment in VR, where women have
been groped have caught both digital investigators and
lawmakers off guard (Wong, 2016). Fully immersive sys-
tems, which envelope the entirety of a user’s vision, force
the user to impart their trust to the VR system’s safety
mechanisms. Users may injure themselves using the sys-
tems, or defraud each other in the VEs. Moreover, social
features of online gaming have recently become a haven for
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money laundering (Editor, 2015). Ethical and legal contro-
versy have kept a legal precedence at bay, however, these
concerns should not preclude a thorough forensic evalua-
tion (Lemley and Volokh, 2017).
Preliminary work has been conducted on disk and net-
work artifacts of VR systems, however, volatile memory is
a source yet to be considered (Yarramreddy et al., 2018).
Large amounts of information, that may not be available
in traditional storage can be recovered from volatile mem-
ory. This may include running processes, network con-
nections, chat messages and encryption keys (Case and
Richard, 2017). VR systems are no exception; the complex
tracking system and device events are largely handled in
memory. Traditional “dead” analysis will not recover such
evidentiary data.
As forensic techniques continue to improve and adver-
sary tactics evolve, memory forensics has become increas-
ingly important. Malware and exploitation tools are pro-
gressively reducing their non-volatile footprint and thus
evidence collection must keep pace. As the field was once
primarily focused on operating system level forensics (Case
and Richard, 2017), application and device specific data
collection is too finding relevance (Anglano et al., 2017;
Sylve et al., 2012). Today, our homes have been filled
with an ecology of devices. We have seen the epic rise of
smart phones, eReaders, smart watches, fitness and health
trackers, gaming devices, smart TVs, Internet of Things
devices, etc. Virtual Reality devices are now moving into
this complex playing field and require a forensic evaluation
of volatile memory.
With MR systems blending together virtual and physi-
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cal experiences, malware targeting these devices may have
a slew of additional capabilities. An immersed user, who
trusts both their vision and hearing to the VR device,
is a perfect target for an attack that could even bring
about physical harm (Casey et al., 2019; UNHcFREG,
2018). Should the VE be maliciously modified to dis-
rupt or deceive an immersed user, the calibration between
the physical and virtual space will inevitably be compro-
mised. Thus, an onlooker cannot reliably ascertain the
user’s virtual orientation from their physical. This discrep-
ancy would only be found in the live copy of the system’s
configuration, residing only in memory.
The HTC Vive, which provides a fully immersive VR
experience and utilizes the most popular gaming platform,
Steam, is a fitting candidate for study (Bailey, 2018). In
this work, we conduct an analysis of the runtime of the
HTC Vive to identify potential sources of digital evidence
unique to volatile memory. We develop a methodology to
locate, and extract these data structures from a memory
dump. Finally, we automate the process and form a 3-
dimensional reconstruction of the VE via a plugin for the
Volatility Framework. Our work provides the following
contributions:
1. To the best of our knowledge this is the primary ac-
count for specifically examining the memory forensics
of VR systems.
2. We share our analysis and findings that may impact
future investigations involving VR systems.
3. We employ and share a reusable methodology that
may be adopted by others to create similar plugins.
4. We construct an open source tool Vivedump, that may
be used in the analysis of memory dumps of HTC Vive
VR systems and share related datasets. The tool is a
plug-in for the widely adopted Volatility framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
familiarize the reader with VR related components and
discuss related work in Section 2. We present the details of
our apparatus and applications used in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4, we present our methodology from scenario creation
through plugin development. Our findings are presented
and discussed in Sections 5 and 6 respectively. Finally, we
identify areas of future work (Section 7) and make con-
cluding remarks (Section 8).
2. Background Information and Related Work
VR has been the subject of research in many different
academic disciplines for a very long time. There is much
research on what technology would be required for such a
system, and on potential future uses for this technology.
Only recently have consumer grade VR devices become
available. State-of-the art work has only scratched the
surface on the forensics and security of VR. de Guzman
et al. (2018) provided a survey of privacy and security
research and approaches in MR. Most relevant to our work
is the work by Yarramreddy et al. (2018) which considered
disk and network artifacts of social VR applications, while
Casey et al. (2019) evaluated the security of these systems
and implemented proof-of-concept attacks.
Currently there are three types of consumer VR systems
available. Firstly, systems that operate through a small
scale device, typically a smart phone with a peripheral
such as Google Cardboard or the Samsung Gear VR. Sec-
ondly, standalone systems that do not require additional
hardware, such as the Oculus Go and Google Daydream.
Finally, systems driven by a desktop or laptop computer,
which allow for a more robust experience. These systems
are typically fully immersive and allow room-scale play,
requiring a tracking system. One such system is the HTC
Vive and is the focus of our work. Readers familiar with
this system, may want to skip the next two paragraphs,
but we chose to describe the details of the HTC Vive sys-
tem, and it’s Application Programming Interface (API)
below.
The HTC Vive base configuration consists of a headset
or Head Mounted Display (HMD) which is tethered to a
computer, two wireless handheld controllers, and two wall
mounted base stations that are responsible for tracking
the other devices. The base stations employ Valve Cor-
poration’s lighthouse technology to sweep the room with
infrared light and triangulate the tracked devices. The fi-
nal computed location in virtual space is referred to as a
pose. Aside from HDMI image processing on the HMD, the
computer driving the system handles the bulk of the work-
load, allowing for convenient memory collection and anal-
ysis. Applications are typically launched through Steam,
a digital distribution platform developed by Valve, with
SteamVR responsible for the VR runtime. To promote
third-party application development, Valve established a
framework that can be expanded to suit any VR system
known as OpenVR.
OpenVR is an API designed to free developers from
relying on hardware specific Software Development Kits
(SDKs). Simply a collection of virtual functions matched
to the appropriate VR interface, OpenVR allows appli-
cations to maintain compatibility among several systems
and SDKs (Valve Software, 2018). Although OpenVR can
power a variety of systems, OpenVR’s developer Valve
partnered with the development of the HTC Vive. Uti-
lizing the API, we can access hardware and tracking infor-
mation otherwise unavailable to the user.
One such component of the VE is the Chaperone. Be-
cause the system is fully immersive and encapsulates the
entirety of the user’s vision, there must be some protection
from physical obstacles. When in close proximity to the
user defined boundaries, a virtual wall (Chaperone) will
appear and notify the user.
2.1. Memory Forensics
Formal memory forensics arrived on the scene as early
as 2001, with the first structured analysis tools surfacing
in 2004 (Case and Richard, 2017), and a wave of work in
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2005 and 2006 with the Digital Forensics Research Work-
shop (DFRWS) Forensics Challenges from those years that
spurred several analysis tools such as the Volatility Frame-
work (DFRWS, 2006a,b; Volatility Foundation, 2018).
Factors such as disk encryption and the rise of memory
resident malware have contributed to the need for mem-
ory forensics tools. Initially, memory forensics focused on
malware analysis, until the benefits to other types of in-
vestigations were realized. Much work has subsequently
been conducted in the areas of memory acquisition, and
memory analysis. Gruhn and Freiling (2016) provided an
evaluation of methods of acquisition and analysis, compar-
ing the correctness, atomicity and integrity of each. Work
focusing on acquisition includes Petroni et al. (2006) with
the introduction of FATKit, acquisition of persistent sys-
tems (Huebner et al., 2007), and the use of rootkits to limit
aquisition (Bilby, 2006).
A presentation on the subversion of memory forensic ac-
quisition, the work by Schatz (2007) suggests a minimal
operating system injected into a host system to acquire
memory dumps without the need to be concerned with the
problems of trust where a rootkit may be present in the
host operating system. Balogh (2014) demonstrated the
use of a network interface controller to use direct mem-
ory access for memory acquisition.Memory forensics has
changed the traditional digital paradigm such that modus
operandi of digital forensics has changed: One can no
longer simply pull the plug immediately. Memory foren-
sics seems to add complexity, but it is an approach needed
to deal with an increasingly complex digital world.
Analyzing a memory dump can be as equally complex,
as volatile memory is transient, with each component or
application having its own address space. In addition, pag-
ing and redundancy can complicate the availability of in-
formation. A great deal of work has been conducted on
the forensics of operating systems. Dolan-Gavitt (2008)
demonstrated analysis of the registry in main memory,
and van Baar et al. (2008) targeted files mapped in mem-
ory. Zhang et al. (2009) showed Windows kernel processor
control region based analysis and the work by Maartmann-
Moe et al. (2009) demonstrate the use of memory foren-
sics to recover cryptographic keys. Hejazi et al. (2009)
provided further analysis of main memory in Windows
through work with security specific calls and the call stack.
The technique allowed for data recovered with previous
string search methods. Data structures used by DOSKEY
were examined by Stevens and Casey (2010), which al-
lowed the command line history to be discovered in mem-
ory.
Data extraction, being an important goal of memory
analysis can be heavily reliant on reverse engineering in
the absence of source code and further complicated by
the diversity of applications and their frequent updates.
Huebner et al. (2007) presented a method of creating pro-
files from C source code to automate this process. Manual
searches can be time consuming and lag behind the most
current operating system version, yet several tools ben-
efit from this (Betz, 2005; Jr. and Mora, 2005). With
YARA, a useful pattern matching tool for malware detec-
tion, textual and binary patterns can be quickly identi-
fied (Alvarex, 2018). Cohen (2017) showed how YARA
can be applied to memory to maintain context between
Virtual Address Descriptors (VADs). Our work employs
YARA scanning across a process’s virtual address space,
however, signatures do not span multiple VADs. At the
time of writing, there was no literature addressing the
memory forensics of VR systems, and as such, literature
in that domain is lacking.
3. Apparatus
In this section, we describe the devices and software used
in our methodology. A desktop workstation was used to
drive the VR system, the details of which can be found in
Table 1. Post-collection memory analysis was conducted
using Volatility and the resulting plugin was designed to
function within the Volatility Framework. Because the
Windows profiles necessary for memory analysis were not
included in the latest release (at the time of writing),
namely, Windows 10 x64 Build 16299, the most up-to-date
profiles were obtained directly from the source code1. The
VR system used in this study was an HTC Vive with the
standard components. Details of the Vive and individual
devices are presented in Table 2.
4. Methodology
This section describes the process used to identify mem-
ory locations associated with our targeted data structure
and the means of reliable access. A high level overview
of the methodology is presented in Figure 1. Creating a
scenario with predictable values, we conduct memory anal-
ysis to locate potential data containing memory regions.
Pointer scans are conducted to identify routes to the data
and the machine instructions are inspected to ensure static
references. Using the machine instructions as a YARA sig-
nature and the aforementioned routes, we constructed a
Volatility plugin to automatically extract the data from a
memory dump.
4.1. Documentation Analysis
We began our study with an analysis of the OpenVR
API. The API documentation was surveyed to identify
data structures found to contain information that may be
of interest to a forensic investigator or hold Sensitive Per-
sonal Information (SPI). Table 3 shows the data struc-
tures of interest for this study, some of which are tracked
device pose information, device class, device state / ac-
tivity, hardware and firmware versions. The objective of
this portion of the study was to determine the extent to
1https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility (last
accessed 2018-10-25).
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Table 1: Workstation Details
System Details Application Details
Device Details Application Name Version
Processor Intel Core i7-6700 CPU Cheat Engine 6.7
System Type: 64-bit OS, x64 processor DumpIt 3.0.20170909.1
Graphics Card NVDIA GeForce GTx 1070 Microsoft Visual Studio 10.0.16299.0
Manufacturer iBUYPOWER OpenVR v1.0.13
Installed Memory (RAM) 8.00 GB SteamVR 1523310137
Volatility 2.6
2. Memory Scan
4. Reverse Engineer
1. Scenario creation
with known values
3. Identify 
memory  locations
5. Static data access 
points and routes
6. Develop Volatility / Rekall
plugins
7. Tool to extract forensically
 valuable information
Live analysis
Post-collection
Figure 1: Methodology.
Table 2: HTC Vive Details
Device Device ID Firmware Hardware
Headset LHR-941D5CC1 1462663157 0x80020100
Basestation LHB-BD6F4BB6 436 0x09000009
Basestation LHB-016BDC7A 436 0x09000009
Vive Controller LHR-FDDA1B43 1465809478 0x81010500
Vive Controller LHR-FFE6DB47 1465809478 0x81010500
Table 3: OpenVR Data Structures and Enumerators
Data Contents
TrackedDevicePose t Pose and status of tracked device
HmdMatrix34 t Tracked device tranformation matrix
ETrackedDeviceClass Type of Device
ETrackedDeviceProperty Static device properties
EVRState Status of the overall system
EVREventType Event types
EDeviceActivityLevel Level of Hmd activity
VREvent Notification t Notification related events
VREvent Overlay t Overlay Events
VREvent Ipd t Ipd change
which information is readily available in memory and un-
derstand the layout and data type of the structures we
aim to extract. It should be noted that data structures
found in the OpenVR documentation may not perfectly
translate to the underlying VR runtime. Both SteamVR
and OpenVR are authored by Valve Corporation, thus we
find many similarities.
We will not present the details of each data structure
we investigated, rather, we will use a single example to
trace our methodology. Listing 1 shows the OpenVR
header declaration of TrackedDevicePose t. Not de-
picted, each component of the HMD matrices or vectors
are float values and ETrackingResult is an enumerator.
With this in mind, while conducting our memory anal-
ysis we can expect the structure to be laid out as fol-
lows: (3 ∗ 4)floatHmdMatrix34 t + 3 ∗ floatvV elocity + 3 ∗
floatvAngularV elocity + inteTrackingResult + 2 ∗ bool. The
C++ standard states that the complier cannot reorder
struct members, thus we can also expect to find the data in
the order shown in Listing 1 (International Organization
for Standardization, 2017, 12.2.17).
Listing 1 : TrackedDeviePose t
1 s t r u c t TrackedDevicePose t
2 {
3 HmdMatrix34 t mDeviceToAbsoluteTracking ;
4 HmdVector3 t vVe loc i ty ;
5 HmdVector3 t vAngularVeloc i ty ;
6 ETrackingResult eTrackingResult ;
7 bool bPoseIsVal id ;
8 bool bDeviceIsConnected ;
9 } ;
4.2. Scenario Creation
In order to search for the targeted data in memory,
we must be able to either manipulate the variable to a
known value or acquire the value directly from the VR
runtime. We can control and record the state of the VR
system as it is in physical space, yet much of the underly-
ing tracking and hardware information is transparent to
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the user. Leveraging OpenVR, we developped a mini-
mal helper program to output each of the components of
TrackedDevicePose t to the console. We then manipu-
lated the physical position of the HMD and observed the
changes to the data structure. In doing so we verified
our observed output, but also establish known location in
physical space. However, the helper program’s interaction
with the VR runtime would not be typical of a normal user
experience and would thus taint future memory collection.
For our post-collection analysis, we must be able to ver-
ify the correctness of our location without the aid of our
helper program. Thankfully, the VE and pose units are
in meters, allowing a measurable conversion from physical
location to virtual pose location.
Observing the values of each component of
TrackedDevicePose t under device manipulation,
we find mDeviceToAbsoluteTracking to be suitable
for memory searching. Representing the 3-dimensional
transformation, we can expect the value to be unique
and relatively constant. The most intuitive and verifiable
data point to search for in this structure is the x, y, and
z positional coordinates of the tracked device, found in
mDeviceToAbsoluteTracking[0][3], [1][3], [2][3]
respectively. Both velocity data vectors are not practical
because of the difficulty associated with maintaining a
constant value. Furthermore, eTrackingResult and the
boolean values may not be distinct enough to narrow
memory search results.
4.3. Memory Scanning
Once the pose coordinate information is readily avail-
able via our helper program, we can conduct a memory
search to locate the data. We elected to use Cheat Engine
to locate and identify pointers to the data (Byte, 2018).
Targeting the VR runtime, we limit our search to memory
allocated to the processes child to SteamVR. Future work
may expand our search to specific user VR applications.
As we might expect, the VR tracking system will con-
stantly be updating the location, however, Cheat Engine
allows for rounded float searching, providing the necessary
tolerances for the data to be found. Filtering results for
memory regions that are rapidly updating, we were able
to identify a single range of addresses aligned with the
expected size of the structure.
Manual inspection of the address and the following val-
ues adhered to what would be expected. To eliminate false
positives and directly correlate memory location to pur-
pose, we manipulated the physical location of the HMD
while continuing to monitor the candidate memory region.
If the changes to the physical system were synchronous
with the values in memory and values corresponded to that
of the helper program, we were certain the candidate mem-
ory region was representative of the targeted data struc-
ture.
4.4. Working Backwards to a Static Reference
Over multiple collections, data was found to be dynam-
ically stored, therefore, to reliably locate in the absence of
scenario information we must tie the address to a static
location. By conducting a pointer scan in Cheat Engine
we worked our way backwards to a static reference in the
execution block. The VR runtime includes several cooper-
ative processes, however, most information regarding the
hardware was found to originate from vrmonitor.exe, thus,
we selectively filtered for these base addresses and routes.
In doing so, we ensured that the data was locatable re-
gardless of its placement in memory.
Sorting the results of the pointer scan by number of
hops, we found the shortest path to the data block:
Base: "vrmonitor.exe"+00206950 Offset: 68
The pointer simply originating from the executable as
opposed to the Thread Stack or a Dynamically Linked Li-
brary (DLL) does not alone indicate that that base address
will be reliable. Cheat Engine indicates if an address is lo-
cated in the DATA portion of the executable, and thus
“hard coded”. We can further strengthen our ability to
locate the base address of our route, which will in turn aid
in plugin development by identifying the machine instruc-
tions which assess our base address. This was achieved by
attaching a debugger to the process vrmonitor.exe, and ob-
serving accesses and writes to the base address. It should
be noted that we observed the frequency of accesses to
correlate to the frequency of tracking pose updates.
4.5. YARA signatures and Memory Collection
We can then use accessing or writing instructions as a
signature to locate our base address. A disassembly of this
portion of memory yielded is shown in Listing 2. Line 1
being the location at which the pointer to the data struc-
ture is accessed. Because the pointer is accessed using an
offset from the instruction pointing register, we confirm
this will be a reliable point of access.
Listing 2 : Disassembly of Base Address Access
1 48 8b 05 25 d6 10 00
MOV RAX, [ RIP+0x10d625 ]
2 48 85 c0 TEST RAX, RAX
3 75 2a JNZ + 2a
4 sn ip
Memory was then collected using the tool Dumpit. In-
formation regarding the state of the system and location
of each device was recorded at the time of collection. The
helper program, Cheat Engine and the debugger would
not be typical of a normal user experience, thus, prior to
collection the system is restarted. Therefore, we cannot
use the VR tracking system to record the device location,
however, as previously discussed, known virtual locations
and their coordinates have been established.
Conducting a YARA scan on a memory dump for the
machine instructions is shown in Listing 2, Line 1 we can
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ensure that the signature is unique, and will not produce
a false positive for the base address. Additionally this
provided us with the physical address of our signature in
the memory dump. Volatility’s interactive memory image
explorer, volshell, allowed us to manually trace the path
to the data block, and validate its contents. Dereferenc-
ing the contents of RIP+0x10d625 and applying the offset
0x68, we observed an array of float values. These were
confirmed, over multiple memory collections, to accurately
represent the location of the HMD.
4.6. Plugin Development
The Volatility plugin Vivedump, automates the process
of locating the base address and dereferencing the chain of
pointers. Pseudo-code for the general process of locating
the data is presented in Algorithm 1. The example used
to trace the methodology is blunt, requiring only a single
dereference, however, other data structures may require
several steps. Enumerating Python lists allows for easy
handling of variable length routes to the data (Lines 2, 7).
Considering only the process space for vrmonitor has
its benefits (Line 4), being limited signature collisions and
reduced computing time. This is particularly favorable
as VR capable machines typically have a large amount of
Random-access Memory (RAM). We integrated command
line options to allow the search space to be expanded, as
we anticipate evidence will originate from other Steam pro-
cesses or third party applications.
Enumerating the VAD tree for the process, we conduct
a YARA scan for the signatures determined in Section 4.5
(Lines 4-5). Finally, the pointer is dereferenced and the off-
set applied in accordance with the specified route r (Lines
7-8). The result is the address of the targeted data struc-
ture. Still the plugin’s output can be improved by handling
data interpretation as well.
Algorithm 1 Vivedump: Locate target data
1: y ← yara.compile(rule) . Base address signature
2: r ← [offset1, offset2, ...] . Route
3: for task ∈ processList do
4: if task = vrmonitor.exe then
5: for vad ∈ getProcessV ad do
6: m← y.match(vad) . Address of YARA
match
7: for offset ∈ r do . Traverse route
8: m← dereference(m) + offset
9: end for
10: return m . Address of target data
11: end for
12: end if
13: end for
4.6.1. Reconstruction and Interpretation
Remembering that the first location coordinates we
searched for was located at HmdMatrix34 t[0][3], the base
of the data structure must be 3 ∗ sizeof(Float) prior. We
can then proceed to process 12 consecutive 32 bit values
as type float, into our reconstructed mDeviceToAbsolute-
Tracking matrix. Following the structure described in List-
ing 1, the succeeding group of three floats are assigned to
vVelocity and vAngularVelocity.
We are fortunate that the enumerator declaration is pro-
vided in the OpenVR documentation. We can then reit-
erate the enumerator as a Python dictionary to aid in in-
terpretation. The ETrackingResult was observed to be a
32-bit unsigned integer and read accordingly. Finally the
remaining boolean values occupy the the upper and lower
bytes of the concluding DWORD. A bit mask was applied
to isolate each value.
5. Findings
5.1. Data Availability
Repeating the methodology for items in Table 3, we are
able to find routes to access many of the data structures.
A summary of our findings and extractable evidentiary
data by our plugin is presented in Table 4. Again, with
enumerated type data such as tracked device state, activity
and class we are able to use the OpenVR documentation
to ease our interpretation of the data.
Our focus was directed towards acquiring information
that would allow for the reconstruction of the VE and have
every reason to believe that with a thorough investigation
all desired data could be obtained from memory. Elements
of Table 4 are complementary in painting a picture of the
VR system at the time of memory collection. Utilizing the
information given from the tracked device state, we can
detect the number of devices present, while the activity
level allows us to determine which tracked devices were
recently moved.
Most VR applications, aside from particular utility type
OpenVR applications, require an HMD to be present. By
default, the HMD will always occupy the first position of
the TrackedDevicePose array, however, we did not observe
a trend in array position for other devices, namely the con-
trollers and base stations. There is likely a race condition
at startup during the initialization of these Bluetooth de-
vices. For this reason we must be able to detect the type
of device in the latter pose array positions. Generally, the
base stations can be identified from their location, as they
are typically wide spread, elevated and at the outskirts of
the room. Nonetheless, we can definitively determine the
device class using the described route.
The methodology could repeated for the controllers and
base stations, however for most data structures this is not
necessary. Often the structures are allocated in an array,
meaning following the corresponding HMD data we can
process each subsequent device. For this reason we only
include routes for the HMD in Table 4.
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Table 4: Summary of Routes to Data Structures
Data Structure YARA Signature Route
TrackedDevicePose Array 48 8b 05 25 D6 10 00 0x10D62C
—- HmdMatrix34 t + 0x5C
—- ETrackingResult + 0xA4
—- bPoseIsValid + 0xA8
—- bDeviceIsConnected + 0xAA
HMD State 48 8b 05 55 A4 13 00 0x13A45C, 0x1E0, 0x 0B8, 0x68
—- HMD Activity + 0x10
TrackedDevice Class 48 8b 05 55 A4 13 00 0x13A45C, 0x190, 0x8, 0x510, 0x3E0, 0x120
5.2. The Chaperone
The data structure containing the Chaperone informa-
tion was easily found in memory, yet no path from the VR
runtime executable was identified. This is likely due to the
Chaperone being immediately loaded on start-up, prevent-
ing the debugger in our analysis from tracing the access of
this information. Other applications accessing the Chap-
erone do so through the vrclient x64 DLL. Utilizing the
application specific routes we can extract the data, how-
ever anticipating the specific application is not practical
nor necessary. Rather, this information is stored to the
disk in json format (chaperone info.vrchap) and often re-
mains in memory. The persistence of the file particularly
holds true should the play area configuration be modified
at any point during the session. Because this information
is available both on disk and regularly in memory we did
not deem it necessary to further pursue extraction. The
plugin will conduct a file scan for the json in memory and
if not found the file can be manually provided to the visu-
alizer.
Akin to the Chaperone, several elements of Table 3, such
as device hardware properties and Interpupillary Distance
(IPD) are generally static or infrequently changed. This
increases the difficulty associated with identifying routes
and signatures, should the data even be present. Often
these properties did not appear in memory searches unless
called upon by a user VR application. Be that as it may,
this information is not unique to volatile memory and can
be easily obtained from the disk. For this reason we do not
consider this information as a worthwhile endeavor and if
required handled on a case by case basis.
5.3. Vivedump: Usage
The plugin, utilizing the Volatility Framework, requires
the memory dump, operating system profile, and the plu-
gin directory as input. Command line options allow for
the user to specify the number of tracked device poses
to extract, expand the breadth of search, and manually
provide the Chaperone file. The plugin will output a tex-
tual representation of all evidentiary data, a wavefront obj
formatted mesh of the VE, and pass the 3-dimensional co-
ordinates to a Python OpenGL instance. Sample textual
output is presented in Figure 2 and source code can be
found at https://github.com/unhcfreg/VR4Sec.
5.4. Vivedump: Visualization
We cannot expect a forensic examiner to easily interpret
the data as found in memory, therefore it is appropriate
to present the VE in an intuitive format. The pose ma-
trix represents the devices rotation and translation with
respect to the center of the tracked area. We can then
transpose the matrix from its 3x4 arrangement to the stan-
dard OpenGL 4x4 transformation matrix and present the
user with a 3-dimensional representation of the room. The
tracked device class can then be used to apply an appropri-
ate mesh to the device for visualization. If acquired, the
Chaperone will be added to the resulting visualization.
This provides context to the tracked device locations in
the physical room, as the Chaperone boundaries typically
outline physical walls. An example of the visualization
produced is provided in Figure 3.
6. Discussion
The data structures that were acquired in this study
were all similar in that the underlying information could
be easily manipulated. This played an important role in
locating the proper memory region. Because many enu-
merators were used to describe device states and events
and several processes are storing identical information, de-
termining the nature of the data is impossible without
some feedback. For instance, a search for a byte containing
the value corresponding to a active controller state would
yield an enormous amount of potential memory regions.
Although, allowing the controller to enter an idle state
eliminates all regions that do not respond to the change.
Furthermore, information that is not persistent is
equally difficult to locate. In particular, an event object
will occupy a new location with every event and unpro-
cessed events will form a queue. This too precludes di-
rect manipulation of the underlying memory region and
drastically complicates the method to locate the informa-
tion. During our analysis we did observe candidate re-
gions, seemingly in a sequential log format, but were not
able to observe any correlation to purposefully triggered
events. Unfortunately, processed events and retired poses
were not maintained in memory thereby incurring a low
probability of recovery.
Much like event objects, the Chaperone could be found
in memory but no obvious path to the data was identi-
7
Figure 2: Sample output of HMD data extracted from memory using Vivedump. Additional tracked devices can be extracted using command
line options (-N).
fied. Data structures that are not frequently accessed or
updated pose another challenge when searching for a route
to the memory region. Our memory scanning tool can eas-
ily identify pointers, but to reliably extract the data from
memory the base address of the route must also be tied
to a static location. This was achieved if a pointer scan
yielded a route from the executable, where if not directly
referenced the pointer could be traced back to a offset from
the instruction pointer. A feature of Cheat Engine, break-
ing the program when the target memory region is access,
allowed us to quickly identify the necessary op code signa-
tures. In contrast, the use of DLLs complicate the route as
the base pointers are passed to the DLL functions, mean-
ing the state of the registers must be further reversed.
This does not entirely prevent this information from be-
ing obtained, however the incentive is not always worth the
effort. As Steam frequently is pushing updates to their
VR runtime, there is a significant chance that the new
builds will render the current signatures useless. During
the course of this study, we encountered three SteamVR
updates that had such an effect. This is of course a chal-
lenge associated with application specific memory foren-
sics. We will discuss several potential methodologies which
may help to overcome this obstacle in Section 7. Unfortu-
nately, many of the VR related data structures are better
manually retrieved on a case by case basis.
6.1. Reliability
All data structures of which we identified routes from
a static location to (Table 4) except for TrackedDevice
Class were consistently obtainable. This was tested over
multiple memory captures, with varying degrees of VR us-
age, connected devices, and applications. Accessing the
TrackedDevice Class information was occasionally mis-
leading or fragmented. Either the path would diverge from
the targeted region or simply fail due to a null pointer.
Although the data is persistent, the intermediate pointers
may be dependent on the state of the runtime. A small
program was implemented to frequently request tracked
device classes which in turn improved the likelihood of the
pointer route remaining intact. This suggests that the in-
termediate steps may be rerouted to point to other data
structures.
One may expect that a valid device class would correlate
with bPoseIsValid, bDeviceIsConnected, and HMDState,
however, disconnecting the device does not affect the de-
vice class. Meaning, if a controller is in the fifth position
of the pose array and disconnects, a query to that position
will still return the corresponding controller enumerator.
That is until another device fills that pose array position.
Thankfully, we observed the byte following the device class
in memory to also correlate to the device state. With re-
gards to reliability, we maintain the preferred route to as-
certain whether a device is connected is via the above data
structures.
6.2. Version Detection
Much like Volatility requires the profile be determined
to properly interpret operating system level information,
the application version holds great weight. As frequent
updates are a significant challenge for application specific
memory forensics, detecting and handling a broad history
of application versions is also necessary (Case and Richard,
2017). Often, with each update to the VR runtime, a
new set of signatures were required to access the data.
Throughout this study, three significant updates caused
changes in the opcodes that were used for our YARA scans.
A built in feature of Volatility, verinfo, pulls version in-
formation embedded in portable executable files (Volatility
Foundation, 2018). In many cases this will suffice to de-
termine the application release. Unfortunately SteamVR
developers do not update this information to match the
current build. Memory dumps spanning multiple versions
were compared, analyzing SteamVR and its dependents.
No direct corollary was observed using the output of ver-
info and the SteamVR version obtained directly from the
software.
The signatures used for each SteamVR build that
spanned this study did not produce any conflicts. No false
positive YARA matches were produced, simply reducing
in lost computation time. Allowing searching for all signa-
tures may be practical as our catalog of SteamVR versions
remains small, yet, with continued updates, conflicts and
decreased efficiency may accrue. Following the model used
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Figure 3: Sample output of the visualization provided by Vivedump.
by Volatility, we intend to remedy this problem with pro-
files determined by additional wider signatures tailored for
each SteamVR release. Each profile specifying the routes
and signatures needed to access each data structure.
7. Future Work
Our analysis of the HTC Vive runtime likely only en-
compasses a small portion of the available data. Further
work is needed to determine the full breadth of informa-
tion that can be extracted. Furthermore, 32-bit appli-
cations and other VR systems or workstations have yet
to be considered. Although the OpenVR documentation
serves as a good reference for data structures and availabil-
ity, many other sources of data may exist. Our method-
ology can be applied for additional structures found in
the OpenVR documentation that are easily manipulated.
Small adjustments can be made to expand our context to
non-documented points and different VR systems.
This study was focused towards the VR runtime and
global data, but did not consider the user application. The
user VR application may inherit much of the same data
and provide an additional source. Furthermore, applica-
tion specific information may be of value to an investigator.
A potentially worthwhile use case involves social VR ap-
plications, where user interactions and conversations may
be retrievable.
7.1. Scalability and Automation
The frequent SteamVR updates dictated our Volatility
plugin be designed to be easily adapted. Although profiles
and version detection too remain part of our future work,
the plugin requires three essential inputs. The YARA sig-
nature, route and type or arrangement of the data struc-
ture. Should a particular case require a new data point,
minimal changes to the plugin are needed. Conveniently,
two of these inputs directly originate from our memory
search tool, Cheat Engine. Regardless of the targeted ap-
plication, our plugin could be adapted to accept the file
output of Cheat Engines pointer scan. Quite often, there
are many routes to the data structure returned by the scan.
Automation of traversing these routes would strengthen
the probability of reliably obtaining data. A heuristic ap-
proach to determining appropriate base addresses from the
pointer scan result will drastically reduce the man hours
and complexity of plugin development.
Future work should consider building a framework to
potentially generate application specific Volatility plugins
with the following compressed methodology:
• Identifies the targeted memory region
• Conduct pointer scan
• Pass pointer scan output to framework
• Framework outputs a fully functional Volatility plugin
Application specific memory forensics will continue to be
a difficult problem to tackle given the sheer volume of ap-
plication production. Automation of plugin development,
although not as reliable as manual investigation, may al-
leviate much of the tedious labor.
7.2. Stepping Through Memory
Our ability to extract information relies on a static refer-
ence to a memory location. Which in turn points us to the
desired data. Depending on the state of the application
while conducting our memory searches, varying pointer
scan results will be produced. Should no route originating
from the executable be found, identifying a static reference
may be difficult. In contrast, we observed a large selection
of routes from the Thread Stack and DLLs. This is par-
ticularly relevant for information sparsely accessed after
initialization, such as device class.
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Creating small applications and stepping through them
on a live system, reveal how simple it may be to leverage
vrclient x64.dll to pull information even from a memory
dump. Initializing an OpenVR instance returns a pointer
representing the VR system, which points to the base of
the DLL. When utilizing a virtual OpenVR function, a call
is made to the the location of the system pointer with the
offset corresponding to the function. This system pointer
can be extracted in the same manner as all entries of Table
4 from an OpenVR instance, or rather ascertained using
the Volatility plugin dlllist.
Rather than relying on the routes derived from this
study, which intermediate pointers may be subject to
reuse, the DLL contains the instructions and pointers to
access the data. We suspect that by emulating the system
from which the memory dump was obtained, we can call
these DLL functions. Preliminary observations have led
us to believe that vrclient x64.dll does not directly probe
the VR system, rather access the location of where the
data is already stored. Because of this, we expect these
functions will continue to successfully execute in absence
of the VR system. This proposed strategy may be useful
in a variety of other applications aside from VR and may
be more resistant to application updates.
8. Conclusion
VR, AR, and MR technologies will continue to improve
leading to additional uses. With increased adoption their
forensic importance will further escalate. In this work,
we initiate the forensic analysis of the volatile memory of
VR systems. We demonstrate that the VE, location, state
and class of devices can be extracted from memory. To
aid in a forensic investigation, we have also developed a
Volatility plugin to automate the extraction of data. Our
plugin and methodology has been designed with future VR
systems and applications in mind, as we hope to stimulate
further research in both VR and memory forensics.
References
Alvarex, V. M. (2018), ‘Yara’.
URL: https://virustotal.github.io/yara/
Anglano, C., Canonico, M. and Guazzone, M. (2017), ‘Forensic anal-
ysis of telegram messenger on android smartphones’, Digital In-
vestigation 23, 31 – 49.
Bailey, D. (2018), ‘With $4.3 billion in sales, 2017 was steams biggest
year yet’.
URL: https://www.pcgamesn.com/steam-revenue-2017
Balogh, Sˇ. (2014), ‘Memory acquisition by using network card’, Jour-
nal of Cyber Security and Mobility 3(1), 65–76.
Betz, C. (2005), ‘Memparser analysis tool’.
URL: http://old.dfrws.org/2005/challenge/memparser.shtml
Bilby, D. (2006), ‘Low down and dirty: anti-forensic rootk-
its’. https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-jp-06/BH-JP-
06-Bilby-up.pdf.
Byte, D. (2018), ‘Cheat engine’. http://www.cheatengine.org/.
Case, A. and Richard, G. G. (2017), ‘Memory forensics: The path
forward’, Digital Investigation 20, 23 – 33. Special Issue on
Volatile Memory Analysis.
Casey, P., Baggili, I. and Yarramreddy, A. (2019), ‘Immersive virtual
reality attacks and the human joystick’, IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing .
Cohen, M. (2017), ‘Scanning memory with yara’, Digital Investiga-
tion 20, 34 – 43. Special Issue on Volatile Memory Analysis.
de Guzman, J. A., Thilakarathna, K. and Seneviratne, A. (2018),
‘Security and privacy approaches in mixed reality: A literature
survey’, CoRR abs/1802.05797.
URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.05797
DFRWS (2006a), ‘Digital forensics re-
search workshop: Forensics challenge 2006’.
http://old.dfrws.org/2005/challenge/index.shtml.
DFRWS (2006b), ‘Digital forensics re-
search workshop: Forensics challenge 2006’.
http://old.dfrws.org/2006/challenge/index.shtml.
Dolan-Gavitt, B. (2008), ‘Forensic analysis of the windows registry
in memory’, Digital Investigation 5, S26 – S32. The Proceedings
of the Eighth Annual DFRWS Conference.
Editor (2015).
URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/12/24/online-
gaming-new-frontier-cybercriminals/
Gruhn, M. and Freiling, F. C. (2016), ‘Evaluating atomicity, and
integrity of correct memory acquisition methods’, Digital Investi-
gation 16, S1 – S10. DFRWS 2016 Europe.
Hejazi, S., Talhi, C. and Debbabi, M. (2009), ‘Extraction of forensi-
cally sensitive information from windows physical memory’, Dig-
ital Investigation 6, S121 – S131. The Proceedings of the Ninth
Annual DFRWS Conference.
Huebner, E., Bem, D., Henskens, F. and Wallis, M. (2007), ‘Persis-
tent systems techniques in forensic acquisition of memory’, Digital
Investigation 4(3), 129 – 137.
International Organization for Standardization
(2017), ‘Working draft, standard for pro-
gramming language c++’. http://www.open-
std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg21/docs/papers/2017/n4659.pdf.
Jr., G. M. G. and Mora, R.-J. (2005), ‘Kntlist analysis tool’.
URL: http://old.dfrws.org/2005/challenge/kntlist.shtml
Lamkin, P. (2017), ‘Virtual reality headset sales hit 1 million’.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paullamkin/2017/11/30/virtual-
reality-headset-sales-hit-1-million/#2337ed02b617.
Lemley, M. A. and Volokh, E. (2017), ‘Law, virtual reality, and aug-
mented reality’.
Maartmann-Moe, C., Thorkildsen, S. E. and rnes, A. (2009), ‘The
persistence of memory: Forensic identification and extraction of
cryptographic keys’, Digital Investigation 6, S132 – S140. The
Proceedings of the Ninth Annual DFRWS Conference.
Petroni, N. L., Walters, A., Fraser, T. and Arbaugh, W. A. (2006),
‘Fatkit: A framework for the extraction and analysis of digital
forensic data from volatile system memory’, Digital Investigation
3(4), 197 – 210.
Schatz, B. (2007), ‘Bodysnatcher: Towards reliable volatile memory
acquisition by software’, Digital Investigation 4, 126 – 134.
Stevens, R. M. and Casey, E. (2010), ‘Extracting windows command
line details from physical memory’, Digital Investigation 7, S57 –
S63. The Proceedings of the Tenth Annual DFRWS Conference.
Sylve, J., Case, A., Marziale, L. and Richard, G. G. (2012), ‘Ac-
quisition and analysis of volatile memory from android devices’,
Digital Investigation 8(3), 175 – 184.
UNHcFREG (2018), ‘Human joystick immersive virtual reality at-
tack’.
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iyK94jFuniM
Valve Software (2018), ‘Openvr sdk’.
https://github.com/ValveSoftware/openvr.
van Baar, R., Alink, W. and van Ballegooij, A. (2008), ‘Forensic
memory analysis: Files mapped in memory’, Digital Investigation
5, S52 – S57. The Proceedings of the Eighth Annual DFRWS
Conference.
Volatility Foundation (2018), ‘Volatility’.
https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility.
Wong, J. C. (2016), ‘Sexual harassment in virtual reality feels all
too real ’it’s creepy beyond creepy”.
10
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/virtual-
reality-sexual-harassment-online-groping-quivr
Yarramreddy, A., Gromkowski, P. and Baggili, I. (2018), Forensic
analysis of immersive virtual reality social applications: A primary
account, in ‘2018 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)’,
IEEE, pp. 186–196.
Zhang, R., Wang, L. and Zhang, S. (2009), Windows memory anal-
ysis based on kpcr, in ‘Information Assurance and Security, 2009.
IAS’09. Fifth International Conference on’, Vol. 2, IEEE, pp. 677–
680.
11
